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The current dollarization debate in Latin America [Bogetic, (2000), Calvo (2000, 
Berg and Borensztein, (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (2001)] focuses on the normative 
policy issue of selecting an optimal foreign exchange system for an emerging market 
economy. At issue, is whether or not Latin American countries should officially dollarize, that 
is adopt the US dollar de jure as the official legal tender.
2 Advocates suggest that official 
dollarization enables countries to avoid currency and balance of payment crises by 
eliminating the temptation of inflationary finance and encourages foreign investment.  These 
effects reduce the level and volatility of interest rates and ultimately stimulate growth. 
Opponents cite the loss of seigniorage and the loss of an independent monetary policy. 
Often overlooked in this normative debate are the positive issues concerning the 
causes, consequences and extent to which these countries are already “unofficially” (de facto) 
dollarized.  We need to know the degree to which individuals and firms have voluntarily 
chosen to use a foreign currency as either a transaction substitute or a store of value substitute 
for the monetary services of the domestic currency, and the implications of such actions. De 
facto dollarization, involving both currency substitution and asset substitution may be 
widespread, but since foreign currency use rarely leaves a paper trail, measuring its scope is a 
particularly elusive task. The absence of empirical estimates of unofficial dollarization makes 
the outcomes of macroeconomic decisions more difficult to predict. The greater the extent 
and variability of unofficial dollarization, the weaker is the central bank’s knowledge and 
control over the effective money supply. Unofficial dollarization also reduces the monetary 
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2 A similar discussion is underway in Central and Eastern Europe concerning the possible adoption of 
the Euro –The Eurization debate.  3
authority’s ability to earn seigniorage from its own currency issue. Finally, unofficial 
dollarization reflects citizen’s perceptions of the stability of the domestic monetary regime, 
the credibility of monetary policies and the perceived stability of the domestic banking 
system. 
This paper presents new empirical evidence concerning the extent to which the US 
dollar already serves as the de facto unit of account, store of value and dominant medium of 
exchange in Latin America. Asset and currency substitution is induced by past inflations, 
devaluations, and currency confiscations. Often, unofficial dollarization becomes irreversible, 
due to network externalities that significantly reduce the cost of using dollars once they 
exceed a threshold level. When de facto dollarization is widespread, the effective money 
supply is larger than the domestic money supply and is subject to endogenous behavioral 
responses reflecting currency substitution on the part of the public. Hausmann et al (1999) 
suggest that under such circumstances, expansionary monetary policy can have pro-cyclical 
instead of counter-cyclical consequences. Unofficial dollarization will thwart government 
efforts to employ inflationary finance to impose implicit taxes on domestic monetary assets.  
Knowledge of the extent of de facto dollarization is therefore an important input into the 
normative debate since, extensive unofficial dollarization is likely to make domestic monetary 
policy less effective and active exchange rate intervention more dangerous. 
Unofficial dollarization also has fiscal consequences. Foreign cash transactions 
reduce the costs of tax evasion and participation in the unreported (unofficial) economy. This 
weakens the government’s fiscal ability to command real resources from the private sector 
and deepens fiscal deficits. The shifting of economic activity toward the underground 
economy distorts macroeconomic information systems (Feige, 1990, 1997), thereby adding to 
the difficulty of formulating macroeconomic policy. By obscuring financial transactions, de 
facto dollarization reduces the cost of enterprise theft, and may facilitate greater corruption 
and rent seeking. Given these extensive ramifications, informed policy decision-making 
requires better knowledge of the extent, causes and consequences of unofficial dollarization 
as well as the specific effects of its components, currency substitution and asset substitution. 
The major limitation of any analysis of unofficial dollarization is that the amount of 
foreign currency in circulation (FCC) is typically unknown.  Despite the substantive 
importance of the issues cited, earlier research has provided no reliable empirical information 
concerning the actual extent of unofficial dollarization. In their review of the key issues 
concerning currency substitution, Calvo and Végh (1992) observed: 
“In the final analysis, the relevance of currency substitution is an empirical issue…At the 
empirical level, the study of currency substitution faces a fundamental problem: there is 
usually no data available on foreign currency circulating in an economy. Therefore the 
importance of currency substitution is basically unobservable."  4
There is now a growing body of evidence [Feige, (1994, 1996, 1997) and Porter and 
Judson (1996)] suggesting that 40-60 percent of US currency is held abroad.  This paper 
presents newly collected data on the location of US currency, specifically, estimates of the 
amount of US dollars in circulation in Latin America. These data enable us to finally 
circumvent the fundamental problem of “unobservability” that has plagued the currency 
substitution literature since its inception, permitting a refinement of definitions and measures 
of the extent of currency substitution, asset substitution, unofficial dollarization and the 
credibility of domestic banking institutions.  
  Once the nature and extent of unofficial dollarization is empirically measurable, it 
becomes possible to examine the causes of dollarization, and to examine the circumstances 
under which unofficial dollarization is likely to become persistent and possibly irreversible.
3  
Hysteresis and irreversibility will be affected by network externalities associated with the use 
of foreign currency. We therefore present models of network externalities that seek to 
determine the conditions under which foreign currency usage is likely to dominate the use of 
domestic currency by specifying the costs and benefits of the flight from domestic currency. 
When network externalities in the use of foreign currencies become sufficiently large, 
countries may decide to officially dollarize their economies, foregoing the flexibility of 
domestic monetary management in exchange for greater financial stability and an enhanced 
ability to attract foreign investment. Panama, Ecuador, and most recently El Salvador and 
Guatemala have chosen to dollarize officially.  Argentina attempted to effectively dollarize by 
pegging the peso to the dollar on a one for one basis; however, the most recent crisis has 
shown this policy to be unsustainable.  
Much of the dollarization literature has focused on the experience of those Latin 
American countries whose hyperinflationary episodes have induced a flight to dollars. With 
new estimates of the extent of dollar currency holdings in these countries, we set also out to 
model the dollarization process. Our empirical models are based on the Argentina experience 
since Argentina appears to be the most heavily de facto dollarized country in Latin America.  
The first section of the paper briefly reviews earlier efforts to measure dollarization 
by indirect means and defines several new measures of unofficial dollarization that attempt to 
distinguish between currency and asset substitution. Currency substitution occurs when a 
foreign currency substitutes as a medium of exchange for the domestic currency, whereas 
asset substitution refers to the substitution of foreign denominated monetary assets for 
domestically denominated monetary assets. The next section presents new empirical estimates 
of the extent of dollarization in Latin America and compares these estimates to earlier proxy 
measures employed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We find that IMF  5
dollarization measures are highly correlated with our measure of asset substitution but appear 
to be imprecise measures of currency substitution. 
The following section extends the network externality model of currency competition 
originally presented by Dowd and Greenaway (1993). We analyze the factors that influence 
individual decisions to use services of different monies showing the motives that lead initially 
to asset substitution and finally to currency substitution. We show that the choice of exchange 
rate regime depends on a number of key relationships, such as: the extent to which the broad 
money supply is covered by foreign exchange reserves, the level of the nominal exchange rate 
and the sensitivity of the number of agents who use the foreign currency to exchange rate 
changes, and the impact of exogenous monetary shocks on the exchange rate. As the use of a 
foreign currency increases, network externalities induce a reduction in the transaction costs 
associated with the use of the foreign currency. Once these transaction costs are lower than 
the costs of switching back to the local currency, a threshold of dollarization is achieved, after 
which currency substitution is likely to become irreversible.  
In the final section we estimate an empirical network externality model of the 
dollarization process in Argentina developed by Oomes (2001) based on the discrete choice 
framework with social interactions of Brock and Durlauf (2001). The estimated model 
permits us to investigate the dynamic circumstances under which Argentina’s de facto 
dollarization occurred as well as the necessary conditions that would be required to reverse 
unofficial dollarization. The model reveals the difficulty of reversing the process of unofficial 





In an economy with unofficial dollarization, the effective broad money supply (EBM) 
consists of local currency (cash) in circulation outside the banking system (LCC), foreign 
currency (cash) in circulation outside the banking system (FCC), local checkable deposits 
(LCD), foreign currency deposits (FCD) held with domestic banks, and local currency time 
and savings deposits (LTD). Quasi money (QM) consists of FCD and LTD. Thus, the typical 
definition of broad money (BM) falls short of the EBM by the unknown amount of FCC. The 
narrow money supply (NM) is typically defined to include only LCC and LCD. However, in a 
dollarized economy, the effective narrow money supply (ENM) also includes FCC. 
5 Thus, 
 
                                                                                                                                            
3 For an elaboration of the irreversibility problem see Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) and Balino, 
Benett and Borensztein (1999).  
4 This conceptual framework was developed in Feige,et.al 2001. 
5 We ignore those rare institutional circumstances in which transfers between foreign currency deposits 
are employed for transaction purposes.  6
(1)  EBM ≡  LCC + FCC + LCD + QM ≡  BM + FCC, where: 
(2)  QM ≡  FCD + LTD 
(3)  BM ≡  LCC + LCD + QM 
(4)  NM ≡  LCC + LCD 
(5)  ENM ≡  NM + FCC  
 
In a regime with unofficial dollarization, the recorded money supply falls short of the 
effective money supply due to the omission FCC, which is typically unknown and is not 
directly controllable by the local central bank.  
Due to data limitations on measuring the amount of foreign currency in circulation (FCC) 
cited by Calvo and Végh (1992), research on the currency substitution process has been 
forced to accept as a proxy for dollarization, the observable amount of foreign currency 
deposits (FCD). Studies of currency substitution, often associated with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), [Ortiz (1983); Canto (1985); Marquez; (1987); Clements and 
Schwartz (1992); Sahay and Végh (1995); Ize and Yeyati (1998); Balino, Bennett and 
Borensztein (1999)] employ the ratio of FCD to broad money as the means of establishing the 
extent to which countries are dollarized.
6 We denote this common dollarization index: 
 
(6)  (DIIMF) ≡  FCD/BM. 
 
Unofficial dollarization, in the Latin America context was often a response to 
hyperinflation. Under such circumstances, a foreign currency may first serve as a unit of 
account and store of value and only later as a circulating medium of exchange. “Currency 
substitution” suggests that the foreign currency largely displaces the domestic currency as the 
medium of exchange. If one is primarily concerned with the extent to which a foreign nation’s 
currency has substituted for local currency primarily as the medium of exchange, it is useful 
to define an explicit currency substitution index (CSI). When the main impact of dollarization 
takes the form of asset substitution, it is useful to define an asset substitution index (ASI). 
Finally, when both asset substitution and currency substitution take place, we define a broader 
unofficial dollarization index (UDI) that reflects the fraction of the broad effective money 
supply that is composed of foreign currency and foreign deposits. We use the following 
definitions throughout the paper: 
                                                 
6 Balino, et. al. (1999) choose to define highly dollarized countries as those whose ratio of FCD/broad 
money exceeds 30 percent. The major shortcoming of this definition is that it takes no account of 
foreign cash in circulation. Further study is required to determine whether there exists a unique value of 
the dollarization index that represents a threshold effect at which point dollarization is likely to become  7
 
Currency substitution occurs when foreign currency is partly or entirely used as a unit of 
account and medium of exchange. Currency substitution can be official or unofficial.
7 While 
official cases are still rare, unofficial dollarization is widespread. The most sensitive 
transaction measure of de facto dollarization is represented by the currency substitution index 
(CSI), which shows the fraction of a nation’s total currency supply held in the form of foreign 
currency.
8 Thus,  
  
(7) CSI ≡  FCC/(FCC+LCC) 
 
Since domestic transactions are typically settled by debiting and crediting local checkable 
deposit (LCD) accounts, when institutional circumstances warrant, it may also be useful to 
modify the CSI and use instead, (CSIn) defined as the fraction of the effective narrow money 
supply made up of foreign currency.  
 
(8) CSIn ≡  FCC/(ENM) 
 
Asset substitution involves the use of foreign denominated monetary assets as substitutes for 
domestic ones, in their capacity as a store of value. It is measured by the asset substitution 
index (ASI), defined as the ratio of foreign denominated monetary assets to domestic 
denominated monetary assets excluding cash outside banks.
9 
 
(9) ASI ≡  FCD/(LCD+QM) 
 
Dollarization is a summary measure of the use of foreign currency in its capacity to produce 
all types of money services in the domestic economy. When both asset substitution and 
currency substitution take place, or when FCD’s are used by firms to make transactions with 
international partners, we define a broader unofficial dollarization index (UDI), which 
represents the fraction of a nation’s broad effective money supply composed of foreign 
monetary assets. Thus: 
                                                                                                                                            
irreversible because of network externalities. Mongardini and Mueller (1999) define the degree of 
currency substitution as measured by the ratio of FCD to total deposits. 
7 Officially dollarized independent countries include the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau and 
Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador. 
8 In some countries foreign banknotes may simply be hoarded and treated purely as a store of value. 
When this part of FCC can be estimated, it should be treated in the capacity of money as the store of 
value and included in the asset substitution index.  8
 
(10) UDI ≡  (FCC+FCD)/EBM 
 
Bank Credibility: The choices individuals make concerning the disposition of monetary 
assets reflects their perceptions of the credibility of the domestic banking system. Since this 
perceived credibility is an important factor effecting the ability of the monetary authority to 
pursue its macroeconomic objectives, it is useful to define a bank credibility index (BCI) 
reflecting the ratio of monetary assets held in the domestic banking system to assets held in 
the form of currency outside the banking system. Thus, 
 
(11) BCI ≡  (LCD+FCD+LTD)/(LCC+FCC), 
 
where LTD represents time and savings deposits in domestic banks. The higher BCI, the 
higher is the public’s confidence in the domestic banking system. 
Each of the foregoing indices depends upon a number of economic variables that 
reflect the relative incentives to hold the different assets described in both the denominator 
and numerator of each index. These incentives include relative rates of return as reflected by 
interest rate differentials, inflation differentials and exchange rate depreciation as well as the 
relative costs and benefits associated with network externalities, switching costs and risks of 
banking institutions. 
The conventional IMF dollarization index (DIIMF ) will be an adequate proxy of de 
facto dollarization when foreign currency holdings are of marginal importance, or when FCC 
and FCD are highly complementary. However, if significant amounts of foreign currency 
circulate for transaction purposes or if FCC and FCD are in fact substitutes, then the IMF 
dollarization measure is likely to perform poorly as an indicator of unofficial dollarization, 
understating the true extent of dollarization due to its omission of FCC holdings. Moreover, 
DIIMF does not permit one to distinguish between the dynamic currency substitution and asset 
substitution processes that our more refined indicators attempt to capture. In order to examine 
the adequacy of the IMF index, we first turn to a discussion of our efforts to obtain direct 
estimates of US currency holdings in Latin America. 
 
Measurement 
Direct measurement of FCC 
                                                                                                                                            
9 Again, a reader should keep in mind that the definition of ASI also depends upon the particular 
institutions of a nation. Its quality is high when the amount of FCD and LTD used for transactions 
purposes is low in comparison to the amount of those deposits used as income earning assets.  9
  US currency is widely used outside of the US. By the end of 2001, 50 percent of the 
$580 billion of US currency in circulation is believed to have been held abroad.
10 US currency 
(cash) has many desirable properties. It has a reputation as a stable currency, and is therefore 
a reliable store of value. It is available in many countries, is widely accepted as a medium of 
exchange, and protects foreign users against the threat of bank failures, devaluation and 
inflation. US dollar usage preserves anonymity because it leaves no paper trail of the 
transaction for which it serves as the means of payment. Indeed the very characteristics that 
make the US dollar a popular medium of exchange also makes it difficult to determine the 
exact amount and location of US notes circulating abroad. Nevertheless, there is a direct 
source of information that can be used to determine the approximate amounts of US cash in 
circulation in different countries. 
Over the past two decades, the United States Customs Service has been mandated to 
collect systematic information on cross border flows of US currency.  The Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (also known as the "Bank Secrecy Act") requires persons 
or institutions importing or exporting currency or other monetary instruments in amounts 
exceeding $10,000, to file a Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary 
Instruments. The U.S. Customs Service has collected these reports, commonly known as 
Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIR) since 1977. Although the CMIR data 
system was established with the aim of recording individual instances of cross border inflows 
and outflows of currency and monetary instruments, its micro records can be usefully 
aggregated to study the size, origin and destination of cross border currency flows. The CMIR 
data system consists of more than 2.5 million inbound filings and more than 300,000 
outbound filings. The information contained in the millions of accumulated confidential 
individual CMIR forms have been aggregated in order to fully preserve the confidentiality of 
individual filer’s information. The aggregated data yield time series observations on the gross 
inflows and outflows of US currency to different destinations. By cumulating the net outflows 
of US dollars to all destinations, we are able to obtain estimates of the approximate amount of 
US currency held abroad as well as the location of US currency around the world.
11  
 Table  1 presents the available evidence on the actual amounts of US currency in 
circulation in various Latin American countries. Column (1) contains the author’s estimates 
obtained from aggregated CMIR reports and column (2) is obtained from informal surveys 
                                                 
10 This “official” estimate, now published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Federal 
Reserve Board, is based on an adjusted version of the proxy measure proposed by Feige (1994). The 
official estimate is based on net shipments of $100 bills from the Federal Reserve offices in New York 
and Los Angles. A more refined proxy measure (Feige, 1998) also includes data from the Miami and 
San Francisco Federal Reserve offices. The refined proxy suggests that at the end of 2001, 40.9 percent 
of US currency was held overseas.   10
conducted by a team of representatives of the Federal Reserve and US Treasury Department 
(United States Treasury Department, 2000). Both measures suggest that Argentina exhibits 
the highest per capita holding of US dollars in Latin America. 
 
Table 1- Estimates of Per Capita Holdings of US Currency and Domestic 
Currency in Latin America 
 (1)*  (2)**  (3)*** 
Country  Per Capita $FCC Per  capita  $FCC Per  capita  $LCC 
  CMIR Estimates (1997/98)US Treasury Informal Survey  
 (Dollars)  (Dollars)  (Dollars) 
Argentina 1478  698  374 
Bolivia 144 NA  49 
Brazil 15  6  108 
Colombia NA  52  81 
Costa Rica  209  NA  130 
Dominican Republic NA  188  98 
Mexico NA 51  124 
Nicaragua 135  NA 25 
Panama NA  648  0 
Paraguay NA  18  85 
Peru 67  185  50 
Uruguay 762  NA  199 
Venezuela 104  NA  93 
Sources: 
 *Author’s Calculations: **(United States Treasury Department, 2000): ***International Financial Statistics 
 
Estimates of dollar FCC holdings are then used to calculate the currency substitution, asset 
substitution, and dollarization indices described in the previous section. Feige, et al. (2002) 
examined these ratios for a sample of twenty four countries for which data were available and 
found that the widely used IMF dollarization index is highly correlated with the asset 
substitution index but appears to be an imprecise measure of currency substitution. 
Figure  1 displays a country-by-country comparison of the conventional IMF 
dollarization proxy ((DIIMF) and our broader dollarization index (DI), which takes explicit 
account of the estimated amount of FCC in circulation in each nation. The IMF dollarization 
index understates the true extent of unofficial dollarization due to its omission of FCC. Our 
estimates suggest that the highest de facto dollarization has occurred in Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Uruguay and Argentina, whereas Mexico and Venezuela are the least dollarized Latin 
American countries in our sample. 
 
   
                                                                                                                                            
11 Feige, (1997) and Feige, et al. (2002) present greater detail on the collection and processing of 
CMIR data.   11















Figure 2: Currency and Asset Substitution Indices for Latin America 














Figure 2 presents our estimates of the degree of currency substitution and asset substitution in 
Latin American countries. The figure reveals that the patterns of currency substitution and 
asset substitution are in fact quite different among the countries observed. Bolivia, Peru and 
Uruguay are notable because asset substitution dominates currency substitution, whereas the 
other countries display a pattern in which currency substitution dominates. 
   12
Network Externalities: Asset and Currency Substitution 
Latin American hyperinflations and severe exchange rate depreciations dramatically 
reduce the rates of return on local domestic currency relative to U S dollars, inducing 
individuals to flee from weak currencies into stronger ones. Such shifts are initially motivated 
by asset substitution to avoid the costs of a depreciating store of value. However, currency 
also represents an important medium of exchange, and the extent of currency substitution 
depends upon the relative transaction costs of foreign and local currency. These relative 
transaction costs are, in turn, determined by the network externalities enjoyed by the users of 
each alternative medium of exchange and the costs of switching between them. For any 
expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, it is more likely that agents will 
substitute into a foreign currency if other agents already use it as a co-circulating medium of 
exchange in the domestic economy. When severe exchange rate depreciation induces 
unofficial dollarization, network externalities tend to reinforce the rewards of holding the 
stronger currency. Switching costs inhibit a return to the local currency even after a successful 
stabilization effort. These well know incentive effects give rise to the conjecture that once de 
facto dollarization has reached a threshold, it may well persist, leading to the observation of 
dollarization hysteresis. 
These considerations have been formalized in the models presented by Farrell and 
Saloner (1986) and Dowd and Greenaway (1993). Building on these foundations, we consider 
(N+1) money-using agents with infinite life horizons. They make decisions on the use of 
currency in time T. Up to time T they used only local currency, but from T onwards they can 
also use a competing foreign currency. Agent’s decisions concerning the use of local currency 
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where u(T) is utility in time T derived from using the local currency from time T to infinity; t 
≥  T are time periods from now (T) onwards; r is the discount factor; n is log of N. If there are 
no network externalities, the parameter (a) reflects the redemption value of the local currency 
when no one else uses it, and bn (b>0) reflects the network externality benefit of others using 
the currency.  
Similar logic applies to the utility of using a foreign currency with or without network 
externalities where an*, denotes values for the foreign currency. Hence, when all agents use 
local currency, 
 
(13)  u(T) = (a+bn)/r  and  u*(T) = a*/r 
   13
 Conversely, when all agents use competing foreign currency,  
 
(14)  u(T) = a/r  and   u*(T) = (a*+b*n*)/r  
 
All agents will hold local currency even if it is not used for transactions purposes 
(hypothetical absence of network externalities), if the utility from holding it for purposes 
other than settling payments is greater than the utility from using competing foreign currency 
when all agents are using it minus the cost (s) of switching between the two currencies. Hence 
all agents will use local currency when, 
 
(15) a/r  >  [ (a*+b*n*)/r]  - s 
 
Conversely, all agents will switch to competing foreign currency if the utility from using it 
when no one else switches to its use is higher than the sum of utility derived from use of local 
currency when everybody uses it including switching costs, that is, when, 
 
(16) a*/r  >  [ (a+bn)/r]  + s 
 
These corner solutions define the conditions under which agents use local currency 
exclusively or foreign currency exclusively. The more interesting intermediate cases consider 
the range of circumstances under which asset and currency and substitution behaviors induce 
both currencies to co-circulate simultaneously. These intermediate cases are indeterminate 
unless agents have a mechanism for determining the gains from asset substitution and a 
mechanism for forming expectations of whether other agents will switch to the competing 
currency.  If agents knew the redemption values of the two currencies as well as the extent to 
which others are likely to switch, they would adopt the foreign currency when, 
 
(17)  [ (a*+b*n*)/r]  - s ≥  [ (a+bn)/r]  
 
that is, when the expected present value of asset substitution returns (represented by the 
parameter a*) and currency substitution returns (network externality returns represented by  
bn*) of the new currency, minus switching costs exceed the expected present value of asset 
and currency substitution returns to the local currency. The limitation of the Dowd-
Greenaway model is that it provides no behavioral mechanism for trading off the utility 
derived from asset substitution with that of currency substitution. This requires additional 
relationships connecting the asset substitution parameters and the currency substitution 
parameters to observable variables.  
 
Asset Substitution and the Exchange Rate   14
  Recall that the asset substitution parameter (a) depends on the redemption value of 
the currency. We will assume that this redemption value depends positively upon the extent to 
which the broad domestic money supply is covered by international reserves that is, by the 
“coverage ratio”, c.  The coverage ratio, (expressed in local currency) is defined as, 
 





(19)  a = a(c),  da/dc > 0, 
 
where R represents central bank's  international reserves, e is nominal exchange rate of 
domestic currency vs. the foreign currency and BM is the domestic broad money supply 
(BM=LCC+LCD+LTD). As long as the coverage ratio (c) is high, the likelihood of asset 
substitution is low. 
It is interesting to note how this ratio reacts to an exogenous monetary expansion. On one 
hand, expansionary monetary policy reduces the ratio (c) by increasing denominator of (18). 
On the other hand, expansionary monetary policy leads to exchange rate depreciation, which 
increases numerator. Since the asset substitution parameter (a) is a positive function of (c), the 
net effect of exogenous monetary expansion on the redemption value of the local currency is, 
 
(20) ∂ a/∂ BM = a'cc'BM= a'c[ e'BM(R/BM) - eR/(BM)
2]  
  
Equation (20) reveals that expansionary monetary policy has both positive and 
negative impacts on utility from the use of money, however the second term in the brackets 
converges to zero so the ratio (R/BM) dominates the outcome. The effect depends on the 
initial level of coverage i.e. redemption value  (R/BM), on the sensitivity of the exchange rate 
to changes in domestic money supply (e'BM), and on the level of the nominal exchange rate 
(e). After normalizing e and e'BM to one, we see that the higher the initial coverage, the greater 
is the impact of domestic monetary expansion on the utility of holding domestic money. Next, 
higher exchange rate sensitivity increases the utility of holding domestic money (reduces 
likelihood of asset substitution) because, for a given expansion in BM, higher sensitivity 
means a greater coverage ratio (c) expressed in domestic currency. For plausible values of 
reserves, money and the exchange rate sensitivity, there is nothing in the mechanics of the 
asset substitution component of the model that can turn the utility of holding domestic money 
negative. Asset substitution will arise earlier if the initial coverage ratio (redemption value of 
the local currency) is lower, although higher exchange rate sensitivity to money supply can 
partly alleviate this impact. 
 
Exchange Rate and Currency Substitution   15
  Dowd and Greenaway (1993) showed that decision to switch to competing foreign 
currency depends on expectations about the behavior of other agents. Assume that agents will 
form expectations about how many other agents will switch on the basis of nominal exchange 
rate movements. When the exchange rate depreciates, agents expect the others to switch. 
Therefore, 
 
(21)  n = n(e), dn/de < 0 
 
Combining, (13), (20) and (21), the utility function under which all agents use local currency 
is: 
 
(22) u(T)  =  [ a(c)c(BM)) + bn(e(BM))] r
-1  
 
The consequences of a monetary expansion including both currency and asset substitution 
effects is now represented by, 
  
(23) ∂ u/∂ BM = [∂ a/∂ BM + dn/dBM] r
-1 =  a'c[ e'LM(R/BM) - eR/(BM)
2]  + be'LMn'e r
--11 
 
dn/dBM <0 because: b>0; e'BM > 0; n'e < 0.  
 
Since the term added to (23) is negative, the conclusion is that the currency substitution effect 
shortens the period in which expansionary monetary policy can be effective (where 
effectiveness is measured by its impact on the utility from holding local currency).  
 
Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
  Equation (23) provides a formal elaboration of the choice of exchange rate regime on 
the desirability of dollarization. As long as ∂ u/∂ BM>0, monetary expansion will not induce 
unofficial dollarization. However the sign of ∂ u/∂ BM is ambiguous, depending upon the 
sensitivity of the exchange rate to money, the extent to which broad money is covered by 
foreign reserves, the absolute level of the nominal exchange rate, and the sensitivity of the 
number of people using the currency to exchange rate changes. In these circumstances, policy 
makers must be concerned about the consequences of monetary expansion since they are 
liable to induce switching out of the local currency thereby making monetary expansion 
ineffective.  
If the two sensitivities are high and the coverage ratio is low, policy makers need to 
consider that a prudent course of action may be to officially dollarize, that is, to either peg the 
exchange rate to the foreign currency or to adopt the competing currency as legal tender. 
Otherwise, unofficial dollarization may take its course, with an induced loss of seigniorage 
and reduced potency of any given monetary action. The costs of these hysteresis effects that   16
derive from network externalities increase as the de facto dollarization continues and may 
lead to an irreversibility that precludes a return to the use of domestic currency. In Latin 
America, with its legacy of high inflation and wage indexation, flexible exchange rate 
regimens may be unable to capture the potential benefits of monetary interventions. As real 
exchange rates become less responsive to monetary manipulation, the need for more extreme 
depreciations increases the dangers of extensive asset substitution. 
 
Further Extensions of Network Externality Models 
Oomes (2001) suggests an alternative means of characterizing the consequences of 
positive network externalities in the use of foreign currencies. Based on the discrete choice 
framework with social interactions developed by Brock and Durlauf (2001), Oomes 
demonstrates that network externalities in the demand for currency can explain the observed 
hysteresis in the unofficial dollarization observed in Russia. 
Our extension of the Dowd–Greenaway model shows that network externalities are 
useful in specifying the determinants and dynamics of the currency substitution process, but it 
does not produce a readily testable empirical specification. An innovation of the Oomes’ 
framework, is the derivation of a reduced form equation that can be directly estimated 
empirically and that can be used to explain the dynamics of the currency substitution 
process.
12 
The model belongs to the class of cash-in-advance models with random matching of 
buyers and sellers. Buyers and sellers have a choice of conducting a transaction in either 
domestic (m) or foreign currency (m*). Each agent that is a buyer in one period becomes a 
seller in the next. The decision problem faced by a given agent i is which currency to hold 
after receiving currency from a random buyer at the beginning of period t and before being 
matched with a random seller j at the end of period t. The currency choice of agent i in period 
t is denoted by mi,t ∈ {m,m*}. 
The cost of holding domestic currency one period prior to the transaction is the 
depreciation of the domestic currency (et). There are also varieties of different costs 
associated with transacting in foreign currency. The first type of cost is the  “shoe-leather 
cost” (σt), that is, the cost of searching for and transacting at an exchange office. This cost 
occurs only if there is a mismatch between the currency the buyer decides to hold and the 
currency choice of the seller. This type of cost can be classified as a transaction cost, or a 
switching cost in terms of the Dowd-Greenaway model. To the extent that these costs are 
                                                 
12 The model does not however provide an unambiguous means of empirically discriminating between 
network externality effects and other potential causes of hysteresis.   17
used as an explanation for the hysteresis effect, the intuitions guiding the two models are 
similar. 
Since the Oomes model was originally developed for the case of Russia, it also 
includes a second type of transaction or switching cost, that is, the explicit tax (τ) on the 
purchase of foreign currency, which was introduced in Russia in 1997. This cost is incurred 
only if the buyer holds domestic currency and the seller prefers to transact in foreign 
currency. Finally, there is a variable that captures the institutional barriers to the use of 
foreign currency for transaction purposes that can be interpreted as the probability of 
confiscation of the foreign currency involved in the transaction (q).
13 Depending on the actual 
preferences of the buyer and seller, the costs of alternative choices of agent i acting as a buyer 
conditional on the choice of seller j are summarized in Table 2: 
  




The decision of the representative buyer to hold domestic or foreign currency will also 
depend on his expectations of sellers’ preferences. If the probability, expected by i, that any 
random seller j prefers to hold foreign currency in period t+1 is denoted by  1
^
+ t p , it can also 
be interpreted as the expected proportion of buyers holding foreign currency in that period, 
that is,  1
^
+ t p  represents the dollarization ratio expected in period t+1.  
The expected costs of holding domestic currency c(mt),  and foreign currency c(mt*) 
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13 Oomes assumes that transacting in dollars is illegal, and that the amount of the transaction, which is 
normalized to unity, can be confiscated with probability q, which then equals the expected total cost 
associated with confiscation risk.  
14 The explicit assumption made in the table is that the costs of transacting in the foreign currency (q) 
are smaller than the costs of the buyer and seller choosing to convert the currency twice (2σ + τ), that 
is, that q < 2σ + τ. This assumption is made so as to remove the indeterminacy associated with the 
question as to whether the buyer or the seller will bear the transaction costs.  
 m j,t+1=m mj,t+1=m* 
mi,t=m e  e  +  σ + τ 
mi,t=m*  σ q   18
 
where (^) denotes expectations. In order to close the model and introduce a stochastic element 
that allows for non-corner solutions, Oomes introduces the random utility terms ε i,t and ε *i,t 
(or random disutility terms) that account for unobserved variables effecting the costs or 
benefits of holding domestic and foreign currency. If ϕ  measures the impact of these terms on 
the expected total cost, the probability pi,t that a given agent i will hold foreign currency can 
be written as: 
 
(26)     
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  The final reduced form for estimating the model is derived employing the following 
additional assumptions: 1) confiscation risk is assumed to be constant over the whole period, 
qt=q; 2) the “shoe-leather” costs are assumed to decrease with the dollarization ratio because 
as dollarization increases, more exchange offices emerge: σt=γ 1-γ 2pt-1, where σt >1; 3) agents 
expect the depreciation rate to remain the same with some probability ?, but will equal the 
maximum past depreciation rate with probability (1-?). Thus, expectation formation is 
assumed to be a linear combination of perfect foresight and the ratchet effect (the maximum 
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The structural form of the model is linearized by the means of the logarithmic transformation, 
and the final reduced form for the model can be written as: 
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and is estimated by OLS as: 
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Empirical Evidence of Hysteresis and Irreversibility 
The Latin American country that has the highest per capita holdings of US dollars is 
Argentina as evidenced by available CMIR data. Our new estimates of dollar holdings in 
Argentina permit us to test the currency substitution and “irreversibility hypothesis” directly, 
by estimating demand functions for the observed accumulation of dollar holdings in 
Argentina.  Kamin and Ericsson (1993), indirectly examined currency substitution by 
estimating “the flip side of the demand for dollars: the demand for domestic currency assets”. 
Our first effort to model the Argentinean currency substitution phenomenon employs 
the familiar partial adjustment model applied to the dollarization index LUDI, logarithmically 
transformed so that the fitted dependent variable fall within the interval between 0 and 1.
15 
 
(32)   LUDI = -Ln(1-UDI/UDI) 
 
The explanatory variables of the dollarization process are those typically employed to 
specify the demand for money in situations where foreign currency and foreign currency 
deposits are available substitutes for domestic money. In particular, we employ as regressors 
the lagged value of the dependent variable, the expected depreciation of the exchange rate 
(dlex), a banking crisis dummy variable (crisis)
16 and a ratchet variable (Ratchet) to capture 
the hysteresis effects that have been observed in dollarized countries when network 
externalities produce incentives for the continued use of a foreign currency even after 
inflation or exchange depreciation effects have moderated. Specifically, the equation 
estimated for Argentina is: 
 
(33)  LUDI = c(1) + c(2)*LUDI(-1) + c(3)*dlex(+1) + c(4)*ratchet + c(5)*crisis 
  
The ratchet variable takes the form of the highest previously attained rate of 
depreciation of the exchange rate.
17  The results of the OLS estimate obtained for Argentina 
are reported in Table 3. All of the coefficients have the expected signs and all are significant 
at the 5 percent level.  Table 4 presents the corresponding long run estimate of the key 





                                                 
15 Mongardini and Mueller (1999) employ a similar model and the same transformation. 
16 Andy Berg of the IMF generously provided the bank crisis variable. 
17 A number of ratchet variables were tested including the past peak inflation rate, depreciation rate and 
currency substitution index. All were highly significant and the past peak depreciation rate was chosen 
to simplify the simulation.  20
 
Table 3 
Regression Results –Argentina -1979-1998 
LUDI 
-0.5839  const 
(-4.1018) 
0.81197  LUDI(-1) 
(19.0302) 
0.13781  dlex(+1) 
(2.23524) 
0.25687  Ratchet 
(4.0945) 
1.67477  Crisis 
(4.56825) 
R-squared 0.97744 
Adjusted R-squared  0.97624 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.51075 
          *t- statistics are reported in parentheses. 
     
Table 4 
Estimated Long Run Coefficients 
Dependent Variable  LUDI 
dlex(+1) 0.73 
Ratchet  1.37 
Crisis 8.91 
 
Figure 3 displays the actual and simulated values of UDI ratio for Argentina for the 
period 1978 – 1999 based on the estimated equation presented in Table 3. Figure 3 reveals 
that dollarization in Argentina began in the early 1980’s and then accelerated dramatically 
during the period 1989-1990 as a result of a severe hyperinflation. Despite subsequent 
successful stabilization efforts, the unofficial dollarization index remained stubbornly around 
70 percent. Argentina appears to represent an economy in which unofficial dollarization 
reached a threshold, after which, network externalities in the use of the foreign currency made 
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The Dynamics of Dollarization 
Empirical estimation of the Oomes model presented above permits a more detailed 
examination of the dynamics of de facto dollarization.  Assuming a zero tax rate, equation 
(29) was estimated for the Argentina data and the results are presented in Table 5 with the 
Goodness of Fit and Residual Tests presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 5: OLS Regression Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic 
0 δ   3.218 0.110  29.20 
1 δ   -0.460 0.077  -5.96 
2 δ   -0.539 0.084  -6.43 
3 δ   -8.891 0.606  -14.67 
4 δ   5.003 0.869  5.76 
 
 
Table 6: Goodness of Fit and Residual Tests 
R-squared 0.98  Adjusted  R-squared  0.98 
Jarque-Bera normality test  244.244      Probability  0.000 
Serial correlation LM (4) test  2.814      Probability  0.031 
Serial correlation LM (8) test  2.714      Probability  0.012 
White heteroskedasticity test  32.183      Probability  0.000 
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The dynamics of de facto dollarization can be illustrated with the use of the phase 
diagram derived from the estimated model. Figure 4 reveals that intersections of the 45
o line 
with a generic phase diagram (showing the structural dependence of this period’s 
dollarization outcome on the outcome of the last period) represent possible equilibrium 
points. A stable equilibrium occurs when the phase diagram cuts the 45
o line from above and 
an unstable equilibrium occurs when the phase diagram intersects the 45
o line from below. 
The diagram indicates that stable steady states exist at either very low or very high 
dollarization ratios. 
In order to explain the dynamic adjustment of the dollarization process in Argentina, 
Figure 5 displays the unofficial dollarization index and the exchange rate depreciation history. 
De facto dollarization of Argentina gained momentum during the early 1980’s reaching 
approximately 25 percent but declined in the aftermath of the 1985 Austral Stabilization Plan. 
As depreciation rates rose once again, dollarization also increased, but this trend was again 
reversed in the immediate aftermath of the Primavera Plan instituted in August 1988. This 
experience suggests that there are conditions under which the dollarization process may be 
reversed. However, as depreciation rates began to rise once again, the dollarization process 
accelerated in the second quarter of 1989, and then exploded as a consequence of the huge 
depreciation that occurred in the last half of 1989. By the first quarter of 1990, the unofficial 
dollarization index reached a high of 76 percent with 90 percent of the value of the nation’s 
currency supply held in the form of US dollars. Despite the success of the subsequent 
stabilization programs and the sustained period of exchange rate stability, the dollarization 
process was never reversed, giving rise to the fundamental question raised about the 
pt 
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Argentina experience, namely, how can one account for the persistence and apparent 
irreversibility of the dollarization process?   
 
Figure 5: Dollarization and Exchange Rate Depreciation 




















The explanation offered here is the effect of network externalities. Once de facto 
dollarization had reached a particular threshold, the transactions costs of using dollars had 
fallen below the costs of switching back to the local currency. The dynamics of this process 
can be understood by examining the phase diagrams estimated for the above model. 
Figure 6 displays two positions of the phase diagram derived from the estimates of 
equation (29).  
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The lower curve’s position is specified under the assumption of exchange rate stability and no 
previous inflationary experience.  The equilibrium occurs at the low dollarization equilibrium,  24
which is a stable equilibrium. The higher curve is positioned so as to reflect exchange rate 
stability in the aftermath of the second quarter 1989 deflation experience where emax=2.8. 
Under these conditions the phase diagram intersects the 45
o line at the high equilibrium 
position, representing steady state equilibrium with the approximately 65 percent 
dollarization.  
The dynamic adjustment to the high steady state equilibrium can be inferred from 
Figure 7, which presents the estimated phase diagram for two historic time periods, December 
1984 and September 1989. For a sufficiently high depreciation rate, the lower and middle 
equilibria disappear and only the high dollarization steady state remains. The estimated 
functions for those periods reveal that the transition from the low to the high steady state 
occurred only in late 1989. 
  It appears that after the 1984 crisis, rapid stabilization reduced the rates of 
depreciation within two or three quarters, thereby preventing the full adjustment to the higher 
dollarization level. A similar process occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Primavera 
Plan. The model suggests that dollarization levels reached the unstable mid equilibrium from 
which they could still return toward the low stable equilibrium. However, with sufficiently 
high devaluation, the dollarization index jumped to the high stable equilibrium from which it 
has not retreated, despite the subsequent long-term stabilization.  
 
 




















The structural parameters estimated from the model imply that ? = 1 δ / 2 δ =.85 
suggesting that there is an .85 probability that any given agent correctly predicts the 
depreciation rate. The confiscation risk parameter q= .08 suggests that agents perceived that  25
holding dollars either in the form of cash or foreign currency deposits entailed a risk of eight 
percent that either their dollars may be counterfeit or their bank accounts might be 
confiscated. Although this estimated perceived risk premium appears very high, it has been 
justified by recent events in Argentina. 
 
Irreversibility 
A final issue that can be addressed by the estimated model is to inquire under what 
conditions, if any, would it be possible to reverse the de facto dollarization process? One way 
of reduce dollarization would be to appreciate the domestic currency. Appreciation would 
shift the phase diagram downwards until eventually; only one stable steady state would 
emerge, corresponding to the low dollarization equilibrium. However, the requisite downward 
shift in the phase diagram estimated for Argentina requires the exchange rate to appreciate by 
35 percent. The impact of a 35 percent appreciation (given the present value of emax) 
producing the requisite downward shift is displayed in Figure 8. The appreciation would have 
to be sustained for a sufficiently long time so as to allow the actual level of dollarization to 
fall below the middle equilibrium, finally coming to rest at the low equilibrium steady state. 
 
 




















Summary and Conclusions 
This paper addresses the positive issue of determining the extent and implications of 
de facto dollarization in Latin America.  In an effort to overcome the 'unobservability' 
problem that has plagued the currency substitution literature, we present direct estimates of 
the amounts of US dollar foreign currency in circulation in various Latin American countries.  26
Traditional measures of dollarization employed in earlier literature largely relied on foreign 
currency deposits as an indicator of currency substitution because actual measures of foreign 
currency in circulation were unavailable. Employing aggregated data derived from Currency 
and Monetary Instrument Reports on dollars inflows and outflows to and from the US, we 
estimate the amounts of US dollars in circulation in various Latin American countries. These 
new estimates of the location of US currency held overseas permit a refinement of definitions 
and indicators of currency and asset substitution as well as the development of more accurate 
indices of the extent of unofficial dollarization. We find that traditional measures of 
dollarization tend to be indicative of asset substitution but perform poorly as measures of 
currency substitution.  
  Argentina appears to be the Latin American country with the highest level of de facto 
dollarization. Moreover, we find that Argentina’s residents have maintained high levels of 
dollar holdings despite almost a decade of successful stabilization efforts.  Argentina 
therefore represents a classic case of hysteresis, suggesting that once a threshold level of 
dollarization is attained, it may be maintained, producing what is known as dollarization 
“irreversibility”. In order to explain this phenomenon, we present models of network 
externalities, which suggest that transaction costs associated with dollar usage fall sufficiently 
beyond some threshold usage of dollars so that switching back to the domestic currency 
becomes prohibitively expensive.  
  Estimates of the network externality model reveal that the threshold level of 
dollarization appears to be in the neighborhood of 35 percent. The dynamics of the model 
reveals that stable steady states exist at both low and high dollarization levels.  The 
intermediate equilibrium is unstable, suggesting that de facto dollarization can take place 
rapidly in the aftermath of a monetary crisis, and once attained may be very difficult to 
reverse. Interestingly, the model also estimates that the perceived risk of confiscation in 
Argentina remained high, despite a prolonged period of economic stability. This perception 
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